When Prophecy Fails: Retreating From Prediction

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ABSTRACT

Doren now argues that SVP evaluators are engaged in "risk assessment," not "risk prediction." Adopting Doren's argument removes actuarial instruments from necessary scrutiny. Doren's position is inconsistent with that advocated by ATSA, Hanson, and other respected figures in this field. Doren's claims regarding prediction are also entirely inconsistent with what he advocated in 1998. When considering other issues such as inter-rater reliability, the applicability of testing standards, and age and recidivism risk, Doren has too often obscured issues. His efforts in this regard have neglected the ethically driven traditions of openness and transparency in forensic psychology.

Introduction

When assessing the recidivism risk of previously convicted sex offenders, Doren (2006a,b) argues that "risk assessment" and "prediction" are conceptually distinct and therefore different endeavors. In contrast to his own position, Doren quotes Campbell (2004) as advising:

Civil commitment proceedings reach decisions that ultimately amount to one of four outcomes: (1) true positive, (2) false positive, (3) true negative, or (4) false negative. In other words, the outcomes of civil commitment proceedings do not equate to a continuum of "more or less likely" to reoffend. Instead, these outcomes assume one of two dichotomous events occurring -- The offender will, or will not, reoffend (p. 122).

Doren (2006a) contends that Campbell's (2004) position is ill-informed:

... his statements are contrary to each and every one of the current seventeen sex offender civil commitment statutes. In none of them do the commitment criteria include the assessment or determination of whether or not the offender will offend. Instead all of them describe that a specified degree of likelihood is required for commitment (p. 3-8).

To support his position, Doren continues to identify examples of the commitment thresholds used by different states. For example, (1) California and North Dakota's commitment thresholds have been determined specifically to be lower than "more likely than not" (e.g. North Dakota's definition for "likely" is "propensity toward sexual violence is of such a degree as to pose a threat to others," a threshold specifically not as high as "more likely than not"); (2) Iowa and Washington's thresholds are "more likely than not"; and (3) Arizona, Illinois, and Minnesota's thresholds have been determined specifically to be beyond "more likely than not" (i.e., described as highly probable," "much more likely than not," and "high probability." Is it even reasonable to say that all of these are really just saying the same thing: will or not reoffend? (p. 3-8).
Verbal Probability Phrases

The varying commitment thresholds identified by Doren amount to "verbal probability phrases." Karelitz and Budescu (2004) characterized such phrases as referring to: "... probability words such as likely and more complex probability statements such as extremely high chance" (p. 25). Karelitz and Budescu detailed shortcomings associated with "probability phrases":

... they suffer from a common deficiency; people tend to interpret them in different ways. The different meanings that people associate with verbal possibilities can result in misunderstandings and errors in communication. (p. 25).

Karelitz and Budescu identified substantial variations in probability phrases published in peer-reviewed journals.

In a recent review of over 25 published studies, we found that the researchers in this domain have used more than 100 different probability phrases (and a similar number of frequency phrases) (p. 27).

Karelitz and Budescu discussed the enormous range of preferences between people when selecting probability phrases.

Over their lifetime, people develop preferences for specific terms and tend to avoid others. Certainly, when they need to choose terms to describe uncertainty [probability phrases], different individuals will spontaneously pick different words. (P. 27).

The statutorily defined probability phrases identified by Doren (2006a) are so ambiguous that they invite a wide range of varying interpretations. This ambiguity becomes compounded when considering that various statutory thresholds for commitment also demand a "clear and convincing" standard of proof (Addington v. Texas, 1979). In other words, we might ask what is a clear and convincing standard of "highly probable" to reoffend, versus a clear and convincing standard of "more likely than not to reoffend," and are there any meaningful differences between them? Or are these distinctions without a difference? For tryers of fact in SVP commitment matters, the de facto question they deliberate is clear and compelling: this offender will or will not reoffend? Doren's invoking de jure variations in ambiguous probability phrases can not alter this obvious conclusion.

ATSA, Prediction and Related Literature

On its website, the Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers (ATSA) provides various informational packages. One of these packages addresses "Risk Assessment" (RA) (ATSA references to "prediction" or its derivatives are capitalized for emphasis and ease of reading). The RA package advises: "RA is concerned with PREDICTING the degree of possibility of a sexual offense for someone with a known history of sex offending." This same package further explains: "It is practically and scientifically impossible to PREDICT any future event with 100% certainty. Consequently, a risk assessment will always involve some degree of uncertainty about the 'truth' of the actual PREDICTION."

The ATSA website also offers a review of "Risk Assessment" authored by Karl Hanson (2000a) (Again, references to "PREDICTION" or its derivatives are capitalized). "PREDICTING whether sexual offenders are going to recidivate is difficult" (p. 1). A paragraph sub-titled "PREDICTORS of Sexual Recidivism" indicated: "Table 3 presents the most well-established PREDICTORS of sexual offense recidivism ... The strongest PREDICTORS
of sexual offense recidivism ... The single strongest PREDICTOR ... (p. 2).

Hanson also referred to the accuracy of various measures for "... PREDICTING general, violent, and sexual recidivism" (p. 3). Referring to the RRASOR, Hanson claimed it: "... is moderately accurate in the PREDICTION of sexual recidivism ..." (p. 4). Referring to the Static-99, Hanson reported it "... PREDICTED sexual offense recidivism (average r = .33) ... (p. 4).

Commenting on actuarial assessment, Hanson indicated: "When actuarial tools are available, they have generally proved more accurate than clinical judgment. The PREDICTION of sexual recidivism is no exception" (p. 5).

Reviewing the titles of various studies often cited in SVP proceedings further demonstrates that prediction is recognized as centrally important in these matters (Barbaree, Seto, Langton, & Peacock, 2001; Epperson, Kaul, & Huot, 1995; Hanson, 2000b; Hanson & Bussiere, 1998; Hanson & Harris, 2000; Hanson & MortonBourgon, 2004; Quinsey, Rice, & Harris, 1995; Seto, 2005). To the extent that Doren seeks to pivot away from prediction, he removes himself from the mainstream of the relevant research.

**Doren’s Previous Position Regarding Prediction**

Interestingly enough, Doren (1998) previously expressed a position regarding predictability that was entirely different from his 2006 position. In his 1998 article, Doren indicated the following: (Again, references to "PREDICTION" or its derivatives are capitalized). "PREDICTIONS of future sexual offending have been mandated by various 'Sexual Predator' commitment laws . (P. 97).

Doren also discussed the relationship between base rates and predictive accuracy.

The relationship between base rates and our ability to make individually accurate PREDICTIONS is statistical in nature. Essentially, if the base rate characteristic within a population is near either 0% or 100%, then one can be correct nearly all of the time just by making consistent PREDICTIONS in the frequent direction. Improvements upon the corresponding PREDICTIVE false positive and false negative rates will be near impossible with scientific instrumentation under most circumstances (p. 98).

Doren further detailed the relationship between base rates and predictive accuracy.

To address the arguments about our ability to make reasonably accurate PREDICTIONS of sex offense recidivism, however, we must first determine the true base rate within the population of relevant subjects ... Only when a reasonable estimation of this base rate is determined can one speak accurately about: (1) the potential effectiveness of our PREDICTIONS mandated by these laws ..." (p. 98)

Doren claimed: "... the relevant sex offender base rates are clearly within the range where accurate individualized PREDICTIONS seem quite possible" (p. 98) Doren further indicated: "The sexual predator commitment laws all require clinicians to make PREDICTIONS of the likelihood of certain offenders' sexual recidivism" (p. 108)

Doren continued to emphasize the centrality of prediction to SVP evaluations.

The final step of each state's implementation of a sexual predator law involving incarcerated offenders entails an individual evaluation and concomitant PREDICTION by at least one clinician. Hence, each state's referral rate reflects the rate at which PREDICTIONS for likely sexual recidivism are made (p. 108).

In this 1998 article, Doren acknowledged that predicting sex offender recidivism responded to statutory considerations.
To be fair, these PREDICTIONS are made at a specified statutory level of probability, meaning that the individual is effectively 'PREDICTED' not to be a recidivist if that level of probability (i.e., 'likely') cannot be demonstrated even though some degree of recidivism risk may still be assessed (p. 109).

Doren detailed the typical circumstances under which SVP evaluators recommend commitment. "Almost always, clinicians' judgments involving positive PREDICTIONS of re-offending are the only ones to result in referrals for commitment" (p. 109). Doren also acknowledged the possibility of mistaken predictions. "These numbers allow a determination of potential false negative rates (i.e., inaccurate PREDICTIONS of non-recidivism) and false positive rates (i.e., inaccurate PREDICTIONS of recidivism)" (p. 109).

Doren continued to indicate that the issue of predictive accuracy was imperative in SVP proceedings. "The main implication of the above findings is related to clinicians' ability to be accurate in making PREDICTIONS of an individual's likelihood for future sexual predation" (p. 110). Doren similarly insisted, "... the likelihood that some offenders will recidivate can be PREDICTED with significant accuracy" (p. 111).

**Why the About Face?**

The pivoting, "about face" shift in Doren's 2006 position compared to his 1998 position is clear and evident. The obvious question is why? Doren may be reacting to recently published data demonstrating that the predictive accuracy of the Static-99 is quite poor (Abracen & Looman, 2006; Craig, Beech, & Browne, 2006; Wollert, 2006). These data challenge Doren's (2002) confident prophecies on behalf the Static-99. More than 40 years ago, Festinger, Reiken and Schacter (1964) reported how a group of "true believers" responded when a small Minnesota town did not suffer the catastrophic flood they predicted. The "believers" proceeded to insist their previous predictions had been misconstrued and misinterpreted. In other words, the "believers" insisted they should not be held accountable for their previous predictions. Similarly, Doren (2006a,b) now disavows his previous emphasis on prediction; but does so without candidly acknowledging his earlier position.

**Avoiding Scrutiny**

Doren (2006a,b) makes it quite clear that if SVP evaluators are not engaged in a predictive endeavor, indices of predictive accuracy (e.g., positive predictive power, negative predictive power, sensitivity, and specificity, etc.) are not applicable to their opinions. Rather than contend with difficult questions regarding the frequency of false positive classifications, for example, Doren gives SVP evaluators a rationale for avoiding such queries. The evaluators need only contend that they are engaged in "risk assessment," not "risk prediction."

This is not the first time Doren has sought to avoid scrutiny of the positions he takes or the data he reports. For example, he appeared to prefer that problems related to the inter-rater reliability of actuarial instruments simply go away. Roberts, Doren and Thornton (2002) reviewed the records of 103 sex offenders referred for civil commitment in Wisconsin. MnSOST-R, RRASOR, Static-99, PCL-R, and VRAG data were obtained for each of these offenders. Three different examiners (two of whom were Roberts and Doren) coded each of the instruments for the cases randomly assigned to them.

Roberts, Doren and Thornton (2002) reported:

...no assessments were made in this study of the inter-rater reliability of the clinicians' diagnostic
assessments nor of their coding of the instruments. In the United States, disagreements concerning diagnosis and/or scoring are typically pursued vigorously in cross-examination (p. 576).

Doren and his colleagues seem to have indicated that if there were any inter-rater problems undermining their scoring, they preferred not to identify them. If so, their position in this regard was less than intellectually honest while attempting to avoid scrutiny.

Doren (2006a) also contends that Campbell’s (2004) emphasizing the necessity of distinguishing between the “field reliabilities” and “research reliabilities” of actuarial instruments is ill-informed and ill-advised. Campbell clarified how “research reliability” refers to the inter-rater reliabilities obtained from researchers who are quite familiar with a given instrument. Field reliability refers to the inter-rater reliabilities obtained by community practitioners providing services in the “field.”

Without using the term inter-rater reliability per se, Doren (2002) has nonetheless acknowledged problems of actuarial instruments and field reliability.

Mental health clinicians [community practitioners] are not typically familiar nor are they initially comfortable with using actuarial instruments. There is a tendency to want to “interpret” one or more items because of what we “know” is “really” being measured when case specifics do not directly show the actuarial outcome we expected. We tend to want to go beyond the strict coding rules in computing someone’s actuarial score, so the score “makes more sense” to us. (p. 131).

To the extent that community practitioners “go beyond” coding rules, they compromise the field reliability of the instruments they use. Quite clearly, then, Doren has recognized the issue of field reliability despite attempting to pivot away from it now. His current “about face” position again seems motivated by a preference to aid SVP evaluators in avoiding scrutiny.

Nevertheless, it appears that Doren is disinclined to acknowledge his previously recognizing the problem of field reliability. He contends: "By definition, inter-rater reliability is a characteristic of the device being tested, not the raters employed" (2006a, p. 3-20, emphasis in the original). Doren needs to carefully consider what the 1999 Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing (1999 SEPT) (American Educational Research Association, American Psychological Association, National Council on Measurement in Education) advise on this issue. The explanatory text for Standard 2.10 – addressing inter-rater reliability – advises: "Information should be provided on the qualifications of the judges used in reliability studies" (p. 34).

If it is necessary to identify the "qualifications" of judges when undertaking inter-rater reliability studies, then inter-rater reliability is not exclusively a characteristic of the device being tested. Instead, varying "qualifications" such as graduate education, accumulated experience, and training can influence inter-rater reliability. Quite clearly, then, Doren needs to reconsider his position regarding what factors influence inter-rater reliability.

**Doren’s Previous Retreats**

In 2000, Doren insisted that it was inappropriate to apply the 1999 SEPT to actuarial instruments. While advocating the supposed merits of actuarial instruments such as the RRASOR, Static-99, and MnSOST-R, Doren argued that the 1999 SEPT did not apply to them.

- ... the instruments do not assess a psychological construct (such as intelligence, neuropsychological functioning, etc.);
- The research developers never claimed the instruments were psychological tests;
• They were not designed for use specifically by psychologists or people who were psychologically trained;

• No psychological training is necessary to use these scales; and

• The instruments are not access-protected as psychological tests are (p. 66).

Doren's understanding of the term "construct" was obsolete and misleading. In discussing construct related issues, the 1999 SEPT stated:

We depart from some historical uses of the term "construct," which reserve the term for characteristics that are not directly observable, but which are inferred from interrelated sets of observations. This historical perspective invites confusion. Some tests are viewed as measures of constructs, while others are not. In addition, considerable debate has ensued as to whether certain characteristics measured by tests are properly viewed as constructs (p. 5).

Continuing to address the issue of constructs, the 1999 SEPT further indicated: "The notion that some tests are not under the purview of the Standards because they do not measure constructs is contrary to this use of the term (p. 5)." Therefore, it is clear and evident that Doren's argument regarding the construct issue was severely flawed.

Doren (2000) also argued: (1) the actuarial instruments are not designed specifically for use by psychologists, and (2) no psychological training is necessary to use them, also necessitates additional consideration. Non-psychologists may use the instruments for screening purposes to aid in institutional placement (e.g., maximum, medium, or minimum security levels). When used for screening purposes such as these, psychological training is not necessary.

Using these actuarial instruments to support expert testimony in a civil commitment proceeding, however, is another matter. Expert testimony relying on these instruments necessitates explaining issues such as: (1) the differences between actuarial procedures and unaided clinical judgment, (2) the significance of inter-rater reliability and assessment accuracy, (3) the differences between static and dynamic variables, and (4) the meaning of Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) values, etc. Psychological training is necessary to explain these issues; and consequently, only psychologists (with rare exceptions) can address them accurately.

Doren also argued that the 1999 SEPT do not apply to actuarial instruments because those instruments were never designated as tests per se by their developers. In fact, however, Doren's argument was also quite mistaken in this regard. The 1999 Standards state: "The application of the Standards to an evaluation device or method is not altered by the label applied to it (e.g., test, assessment, scale, inventory)" (p. 3).

The 1999 SEPT had been available to Doren for a year or more prior to his taking the positions he took. It appears that he took those positions without having carefully read the 1999 SEPT. In arguing the nonapplicability of the SEPT to actuarial instruments, Doren sought to remove SVP evaluations from the mainstream of psychological assessment. In fact, however, the mainstream issues corresponding to the 1999 SEPT are critically important. The validity of any assessment procedure for assessing recidivism risk, the levels of predictive accuracy obtained using that procedure, and the inter-rater reliabilities for field practitioners, all necessitate consideration when evaluating SVP assessment procedures. Applicable ethical standards obligate psychologists to consider these issues when undertaking SVP evaluations.
**Doren's Unacknowledged Retreat**

In his 2002 book, Doren recognized the applicability of the 1999 SEPT to actuarial instruments. In particular, he indicated: "Therefore, recommendations herein concern meaningful procedures for how evaluators might determine which instruments to use in their assessment work, and to do so in keeping with professional ethics (e.g., American Educational Research Association, et al., 1999) (p. 115)." Doren's reference to the "American Educational Research Association, et al., 1999" corresponds to the 1999 SEPT. Curiously enough, Doren's 2002 book neglected to discuss his previous position regarding the 1999 SEPT, or cite the related articles (Campbell, 2001; Doren, 2000).

Doren may eventually retreat from his position regarding "prediction" just as he retreated from his previous position regarding the 1999 SEPT. Both positions are equally ill-informed and biased by what appears a desire to avoid scrutiny. Similar to his previously neglecting a careful reading of the 1999 SEPT, Doren has now neglected to carefully consider the positions of ATSA, Hanson and others, and his own 1998 article. If he retreats from the prediction issue, it will be interesting to see if he overtly acknowledges the necessity of doing so.

**Ethical Considerations**

Guideline VII-D of the 1991 Specialty Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists (SGFP) – addressing "Public and Professional Communications" – states:

> When testifying, forensic psychologists have an obligation to all parties to a legal proceeding to present their findings, conclusions, evidence, or other professional products in a fair manner. This principle does not preclude forceful representation of the data and reasoning upon which a conclusion or professional product is based. It does, however, preclude an attempt whether active or passive, to engage in partisan distortion or misrepresentation. Forensic psychologists do not, by either commission or omission, participate in a misrepresentation of their evidence, nor do they participate in partisan attempts to avoid, deny, or subvert the presentation of evidence contrary to their own position (Committee on Ethical Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists, 1991, p. 664).

Doren's previous position regarding the 1999 SEPT, and his present position regarding prediction, amount to partisan distortion and misrepresentation. To belabor the obvious, expert witnesses mislead legal proceedings when they resort to partisan distortion and misrepresentation. Unfortunately, these are not the only instances of Doren resorting to partisan maneuvering.

**Doren, Offender Age, and Ethical Issues**

While testifying in a 2004 California SVP proceeding, Doren expressed his opinions about age and recidivism risk.

> ... when we look at the effect of – the general effect of aging, which virtually no one disputes, no one that I know disputes – general effect of lowering recidivism rates, that there may be a special category of people who are high risk that aging doesn't affect (California v. Sporich, 2004, p. 9).

Attempting to support his position, Doren described his analyses of data he mistakenly characterized as obtained from Calvin Langton.

I got from him [Langton] figures that ended up demonstrating that, even though in his research he found the general trend, just like everyone else does, that recidivism tends to go down as you get older, that when you look specifically at the small number of people he had who were in the high-
risk category measured by an actuarial, who were also in his high age category of 50 plus, they did not show the decline (p. 28-29).

As Doren’s direct examination continued, the following Q and A exchange occurred:

Q: Are you saying that you know for a fact that age does not matter for these high risk people?
A: No, I can’t be that definitive. I’m saying that there is sufficient reason for concern that research is indicating to me that there may be a special category (p. 30).

**Barbaree’s Testimony in the Sporich Matter**

Barbaree testified on May 6 in the same 2004 Sporich matter as a rebuttal witness to Doren. As the current editor of *Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research and Treatment*, the official journal of the Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers, and the author of numerous peer-reviewed works himself, Barbaree’s reputation is well regarded in this field. Barbaree detailed data he had obtained regarding older, "high risk" offenders. These were the very data on which Doren had relied when testifying in this California matter.

I know from the actuarial instruments when you have someone who scores four or five on the RRASOR, a five-year recidivism rate you would expect would 33 percent and 50 percent. So from the actuarial instruments, from the experience tables that those instruments provide, you would expect in this group of individuals, based on their actuarial assessments, recidivism rates between 33 percent and 50 percent (p. 20).

As he testified, Barbaree continued to clarify:

And, yet, the data that was provided to Dr. Doren for this older age group, 51 plus, the recidivism rate was only 12 1/2 percent. Twelve and a half percent is roughly the five-year recidivism rate for sex offenders in total” (p. 20) [In this sample, only two of 17 "high risk" offenders, 51 years or older, had reoffended sexually].

As Barbaree’s testimony proceeded, the following Q and A exchange occurred during his direct examination:

Q: Dr. Barbaree, would it be a misuse of the science to conclude that based on an observed recidivism rate of two people over the age of 51 that there is a special subgroup of high-risk offenders that are still likely to reoffend?
A: Yes (p. 21-22).

In this same proceeding, Barbaree further advised:

... to state in court in a proceeding like this -- that this one single recidivism rate supports the idea that he [Doren] that there is a group of individuals who remain at high risk through till death -- I guess that's the idea -- just simply, to me, it can't be supported through any kind of scientific process. The conclusions are not warranted scientifically (p. 22-23).

**Iowa Matter**

Just two weeks after Barbaree testified in the California matter, he testified again in an Iowa SVP matter (*RE Detention of Jonathan Miller*). In the Iowa matter, Barbaree further detailed his data regarding older, "high risk" offenders:

The data that Dr. Doren received -- the numbers of subjects in that group was 17 or 16 depending on how you define the group. And the number of recidivists was two. So my concern about this testimony was that two sexual recidivists out of 17 over a five year period is a fairly low rate of recidivism for the RRASOR (p. 12)
Barbaree’s subsequent testimony in the Iowa matter addressed Doren’s conduct in the California matter cited above.

... I am concerned about Dr. Doren’s testimony in California where he, I believe, misrepresented the source of the data; he took data from a study where the authors made it very clear that they’ve examined the interaction between risk and age; misrepresented I think the source because if the source of the data was from a thesis that hadn’t looked at that so carefully then the questions raised about his conclusions wouldn’t have been of the same nature. I’m concerned about his use of data that he obtained by e-mail not subject to the kind of scrutiny that is involved in peer review. And I think we have an obligation in giving evidence to represent the science as it exists on issues in question and the science basically involves the body of knowledge that’s in the literature and archival and empirical studies that have been subject to a peer review process (p. 15-16).

As Barbaree’s deposition in the Iowa matter continued, he expressed the following opinions regarding Doren’s conduct in the California proceeding.

I guess the bottom line is at the end of this and after having had a phone conversation with Dr. Doren yesterday I’m left with a choice between opinions about what has happened here. I think it’s either that Dr. Doren misrepresented the data that he’s obtained by us to support the point he was making in the Trial in California. That’s one option. Or that -- and the second option is that he has conducted analysis of the data that has led to a conclusion that I think is -- I think the analysis is unfounded and the conclusion erroneous. So he in the conversation with me yesterday, Dr. Doren specifically said that he did not intentionally misrepresent the data in his testimony in California (p.55-56).

Barbaree also testified about his phone conversation with Doren the day before his deposition in the Iowa matter.

Dr. Doren requested early in the conversation for us to come to an agreement about not discussing the California case in the context of this Trial. And I said my position really was that if I’m asked the question I’m obliged to answer it honestly and completely as I can ... He [Doren] said can we agree not to discuss the California case or that issue in relation to the Miller case and I said that you know I felt that I was obliged to answer questions that are posed to me and as honestly and completely as I can (p. 71).

Whether intentional or otherwise, Doren clearly misrepresented Barbaree’s data when he testified in California. When Doren spoke to Barbaree prior to the latter’s Iowa testimony, Doren sought to avoid, deny, and/or subvert Barbaree presenting evidence contrary to Doren’s position. In other words, Doren’s conduct in the California and Iowa matters was entirely inconsistent with Guideline VII-D of the 1991 SGFP.

**Conclusions**

When forensic psychologists serve the legal system effectively, their efforts respond to considerations of openness and transparency (Campbell & Lorandos, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005). Without candidly explaining the bases and limitations of their opinions, they resort to *ipse dixit* claims that border on the unethical (Lorandos & Campbell, 2005). Insisting that indices of predictive accuracy are not applicable to actuarial instruments such as the Static-99 betrays obligations of openness and transparency. Doren’s position in this regard encourages SVP evaluators to resort to verbal probability phrases as they testify (e.g., “high risk, medium-high risk”). Ultimately, however, these phrases obscure the many problems undermining actuarial assessment in SVP proceedings.

Doren has also obscured issues related to the inter-rater reliabilities of actuarial instruments, the applicability of the 1999 SEPT to them, and the relationship between age and sex
offender recidivism risk. Doren’s efforts have sought to remove SVP assessment from the mainstream of assessment endeavors in general. To whatever extent he succeeds, he can only reduce himself – and others who embrace his position – to marginal figures vulnerable to ethical challenges.

References


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